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Abstract—Numerous accidents are due to situation awareness 
degradation. However, as there exist many different causes and 
human factors are not well understood, it is very difficult for 
experts to provide probability risks assessments. It is proposed 
here to simplify the problem by classifying accidents according 
to the main demons that degrade situation awareness and to use 
a Bayesian approach with the Noisy-Or nodes.  Interestingly, it 
is possible to use the same approach in the robotics domain. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Numerous Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods 
have been proposed to identify and analyze the causes and 
consequences of human errors [2,3,5,13,16,17]. These 
methods, based for instance on HFACS methodology (Human 
Factors Analysis and Classification System [3]) or on a 
computational model [13], sometimes offer a way to quantify 
human error probabilities and to provide Probability Risk 
Assessments (PRA), see Fig.1. 
 
Fig.1: Standard approach for Probability Risk Assessment. 
 Bayesian belief networks are typically used to this end 
[1,7,8]. According to Pearl, “Belief networks are directed 
acyclic graphs in which the nodes represent propositions (or 
variables), the arcs signify direct dependencies between the 
linked propositions, and the strengths of these dependencies 
are quantified by conditional probabilities” [11]. An important 
difficulty is to choose the variables. Most HRA methods are 
based on the characterization of Performance Influencing 
Factors (PIF) to represent the causes of human errors [7,8]. 
However, human errors are generally associated to the 
degradation of situation awareness, which is a complex 
concept making it difficult to define PIF. Different methods 
are proposed in the literature to take Situation Awareness (SA) 
into account [1,5,6,15]. Several well-known accidents in 
aeronautics and astronautics have been examined from the 
point of view of human factors and situation awareness (SA) 
degradation [3,5]. Endsley proposed a model of human 
decision and situation awareness based on different factors 
that affect perception, action or anticipation [6,17]. However, 
probabilistic risk assessment linked to SA degradation is 
difficult because accidents are very different and statistical 
studies cannot easily be implemented.  
In a recent paper, a model based on Bayesian networks has 
been proposed [14]. The nodes of the network are typical SA 
demons as suggested by Endsley [6]. Several questions remain 
open. First, as SA demons are very general, is it possible to 
use the same risks estimates in different domains? For 
instance, is it possible to use the same PRA to predict risks 
accidents in aeronautics, in astronautics and in robotics? 
Second, what is the reliability of the resulting PRA? And third, 
after each accident, an analysis is performed, some systems 
are modified, procedures are evolving and new training 
scenarios are defined, which should reduce specific risks. 
How to take these modifications into account in risks 
estimations? In this paper, we propose to perform a human 
factor analysis on past accidents in aeronautics and 
astronautics in order to illustrate the methodology, better 
understand these issues and make recommendations. Section 
II, the main principles of the model are recalled. Section III, 
several accidents are analyzed according to their link to 
situation awareness degradation. The objective is to identify 
which SA demon is involved in each case. Section IV, the 
PRA methodology is presented and the main issues are 
discussed.  
II. SITUATION AWARENESS MODEL 
In Endsley’s model, 8 SA demons are defined [6]: 
• A typical “attentional tunneling” error occurs when an 
operator has a strong focus on a specific problem, 
with poor attention to other important parameters, 
which have to be taken into account to avoid an 
accident. 
• An “out-of-the-loop” syndrome occurs when an 
automatic system performs a complex task and 
suddenly gives the control back to a human, who was 
not following the task and is therefore not able to 
handle the situation.  
• An “errant mental model” may be the root cause of an 
accident when a human has a wrong interpretation of 
the current situation due to inappropriate inferences 
from observations.  
• A “complexity creep” typically occurs when a 
problem is encountered and there are so many systems 
involved that the operator is not able to infer any 
useful conclusion to solve it. 
• A “misplaced salience” can be the root cause if the 
interface of the system is designed to maximize the 
perception and attention of the user on a specific 
device, while the salience should be placed on other 
devices.  
• A “Data overload” problem occurs when too many 
data have to be set or taken into account in a situation 
with important attentional or time constraints. 
• A requisite memory trap occurs when too many 
subtasks have to be performed and the operator forget 
one of them.  
• An important “workload, fatigue, or stress” has 
obviously a direct impact on performance and may be 
the cause of an accident. 
See Fig.2 for the Bayesian network with the 8 SA demons. 
Conditional probabilities can be estimated by human 
factors experts but there is a lack of methodology and the 
resulting network is based on empirical assessments 
[12,14].  
 
Fig.2. Situation awareness demons. 
 
III. ACCIDENTS ANALYSIS 
A. Turkish Airlines Flight 6491 
 The flight was operated in January 16th 2017. A thick fog 
was present at destination. The crew tried to land using 
instruments until very low “decision height”. As they reached 
the minimum height without visibility, they decided a go-
around procedure but the altitude was too low and the plane 
crashed just behind the runway. The crew failed to determine 
and follow the appropriate landing procedure for the landing 
of that specific plane on that specific runway under the 
specific meteorological conditions. The human error therefore 
occurred early in the preparation phase. Determining the 
appropriate decision height from charts and procedures for 
landing is difficult when there are many different cases. A 
complementary problem is the wrong mental model of the 
current situation. As the complexity of the procedure is one of 
the key problems here, the cause of the accident can be 
categorized into the “Complexity creep” and “Errant mental” 
SA issue. 
B. Indonesia AirAsia Flight 8501 
The flight was operated in December 28th, 2014. Three 
times, the crew had to proceed according to a specific 
procedure to switch off an alert system. The fourth time, the 
crew decided to follow a forbidden procedure by switching off 
the flight augmentation computer, with the unexpected 
consequence of losing autopilot capabilities (alternate law 
mode). Later on, a miscommunication between the crew led 
to opposite commands and the loss of control of the plane. For 
this specific accident, there are several causes: misplaced 
salience (3 times amber light alert) and out-of-the-loop 
syndrome with alternate law mode. 
C. TransAsia Airways Flight 222 
The flight occurred in July 23rd 2014. There were rainy 
conditions with poor visibility during descent before landing. 
The crew decided to fly lower than the minimum limit and 
finally disengaged autopilot. While the plane was 
approaching the destination, the crew concentrated on the 
visual search of the runway but there was a small deviation 
of the trajectory and they missed it. As they did not pay 
enough attention to the altitude, the plane finally crashed 
against a hill located behind the airport. The accident was 
categorized in “controlled flight into terrain”. When 
questioning the company, it was observed that several crews 
were used to go lower than the admissible limit when the 
visibility is low. It was also found that the crew had too many 
flights to operate in a short period of time. The fatigue was 
therefore a contributing factor. This accident can be 
categorized in the attentional tunneling and fatigue SA 
problems.   
 
D. Luca Parmitano’s EVA 
Lucas Parmitano, Italian astronaut, performed an 
extravehicular activity outside the International Space Station 
in July 2013. During his EVA, some water was observed in 
his helmet. It took several minutes for mission control to 
understand that the problem was serious and to admit that the 
astronaut had to abort the EVA and urgently come back into 
the station. He came back safely but he was nearly drowned 
when he put his helmet off.  The problem was hard to 
understand. There are different systems of the spacesuit that 
use water. As the water could typically come from a leaky 
drink bag located close to the head, most experts thought that 
the problem was minor and did not take appropriate decisions 
(wrong mental model). After investigation, it was found that 
the water originated in fact from a cooling system, which was 
hard to anticipate due to the complexity of the thermodynamic 
phenomenon that was at work and the wrong belief that the 
water could only come from the drinking bag. This incident 
can therefore be categorized in the “complexity creep” and 
“errant mental model” SA problems. 
IV. PROBABILITY RISK ASSESSEMENT 
A. Main principles 
To summarize, for the Turkish Airlines Flight 6491 
accident, the cause is linked with two SA demons: complexity 
creep and errant mental models; for Indonesia AirAsia Flight 
8501, a misplaced salience and a typical out-of-the-loop 
syndrome have been observed; for TransAsia Airways Flight 
222, attentional tunneling and fatigue are involved in the SA 
degradation; for Lucas Parmitano’s incident during EVA 
outside the International Space Station, the complexity creep 
and the errant mental model also are at the root causes. These 
examples clearly show that several situation awareness 
demons are often observed simultaneously in aerospace 
accidents. If providing probability risk assessment for a single 
SA demon is already an issue, providing estimates for the 
occurrence of several SA demons at the same time is almost 
unfeasible. In order to simplify probability distributions 
estimates, and providing that the demon causes are 
independent from each other, it is possible to use the Noisy-
Or framework [9,11,12,14]. The formula is presented below 
(equation (1). ( / … ) = 1 − ∏ (1 − ( / )) (1) 
If the SA demons are independent from each other, it is 
indeed not necessary to determine complex conditional 
probabilities with several variables. The probability can 
directly be inferred from the product of elementary 
probabilities.   
In order to determine risks estimates of situation 
awareness degradation, two methods are possible: 
• First, risks can be determined by human factors 
experts. As it is usually performed in typical human 
reliability analysis, the idea is to list all possible 
human errors as well as their causes and contexts and 
to determine the probability of occurrence according 
to their expertise of the domain. Then, each human 
error is associated to a SA demon (eventually to 
several SA demons, depending on context) and 
probabilities are summed up for each SA demon. 
• Second, as it is proposed in this paper, a database of 
accidents can be analyzed with a specific focus on SA 
demons: 
- List all accidents (plus all serious incidents). 
Here, it is suggested to look at accidents in 
the aerospace domain, but the approach can 
be generalized to other domains such as 
robotics. 
- For each accident, if human factors are 
involved, determine the SA demon(s) that is 
the root cause. 
- List all accidents involving the same unique 
SA demon to calculate the probability of 
occurrence. 
B. PRA updates 
In practice, however, the rules are often evolving (after an 
accident, a procedure is often changed to reduce the risk that 
a similar accident occurs in the future). In order to take that 
evolution into account, it is possible to reduce the probability 
according to an arbitrary method. It is proposed here to use a 
maturity model, which is linked to the number of times an 
accident is observed (equation 2). A similar model has already 
been used to take the evolution of an expert’s skill into account 
[14]. ( ) = ( ) + ( ( ) − ( )) × (( − )/ )  
 (2) 
where:  P(x) is the probability of not observing x (a 
specific SA demon) after n modification of procedures 
Pmax(x) is the final probability of not observing x  
Pi(x) is the initial probability of not observing x (if n=0 
P(x)= Pi(x) ) 
 n0 is the number of new procedures to achieve Pmax. 
k is a decay constant 
 
The idea of the maturity model is to start with an ad hoc 
estimate of the risk Pi(x), and then to take into account each 
accident by increasing the probability that the same SA 
demon is not observed (assuming that something is done to 
prevent the exact same situation). The probability should 
slowly increase towards a threshold Pmax(x), ideally equal to 
1, but as nobody is perfect and it is never possible to achieve 
100% reliability, the threshold is certainly lower than 1.  
Let us illustrate the method with a fictive case. For example, 
the probability of observing an accident caused by the “out-
of-the-loop syndrome” is estimated at 10-6 and a new 
procedure is implemented to reduce the risks. Let us assume 
that experts believe that we will never reduce the risks below 
10-7, 10 additional procedures will probably have to be 
defined and implemented to achieve that risk level, and k is 
equal to 2. The new probability can therefore be calculated, it 
is 8.29x10-7. A graph is also proposed to illustrate the 
reduction of the risks (see Fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 3: Update of risks. 
 
It is difficult to determine all parameters a priori. However, 
the advantage of our approach is that SA demons are very 
general. It is therefore suggested to look at past accidents with 
other systems (here other planes or spaceships) and 
eventually in other domains like robotics. See next 
subsection. 
 
C. Extrapolation to other domains 
It is interesting to look at accidents that occurred in the 
domain of robotics because there are many similarities 
between planes and robots and the use of these systems. In 
aeronautics, autopilots are very common and there are many 
problems linked with human systems interactions, 
inappropriate procedures or attentional issues. In the industry 
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domain, many robots are used. These robots are in general 
autonomous, are able to perfume a long sequence of complex 
tasks and are therefore comparable to autopilots. Accidents in 
robotics are often linked to inappropriate maintenance 
procedures, failure to understand the state of the robot and 
attentional problems. Let us present and discuss examples 
taken from the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration database of the United States Department of 
Labor: 
• « At 1:30 a.m. on January 17, 2017, Employee #1 was 
operating a forklift, removing stacked and wrapped 
bag pallets from a pallet wrapper. A Fuji-Ace 
Mechanical Robot was used to load pallet bags onto 
wood pallets on a conveyor, which moved the loading 
stack to a pallet wrapper. When completed, the 
employee then moved the plasticized pallet to storage 
within the facility. The employee witnessed the robot 
arm that was feeding pallet bags onto the wood pallets 
on the conveyor, strike a pallet bag, loosening a hose 
on the robot hand and causing a mechanical issue that 
stopped the loading process. Employee #1 climbed 
onto the stopped conveyor and walked into the caged 
robot arm area to reconnect the loose hose on the 
robot’s hand. As he proceeded toward the hose, the 
robot arm engaged, striking Employee #1 in the chest 
area, and causing a broken sternum and 2 broken ribs. 
The employee was hospitalized and treated for his 
injures ». In this case study, there is clearly a situation 
awareness error. Though the motivation of the 
employee is not clear, he was probably convinced that 
the robot was automatically stopped. Two SA demons 
may be involved here. The first is “Out of the loop 
syndrome”, because the employee didn’t know 
exactly the state of the robot. A second SA demon is 
“Errant mental model” because the employee had the 
feeling that he could simply solve the problem 
without following safety procedures. 
• « On January 15, 2002, Employee #1, a maintenance 
technician for Xilinx Corporation, was performing 
normal maintenance on a Seiko Epson Handler 
scanner. He removed a side door to improve access 
and finished with the adjustments. While test running 
the machine from in front and watching the operation, 
he inadvertently reached up and rested his hand on the 
frame of the unit. His fingers slipped into the opening, 
and the robot carriage head moved toward the front. 
The outside edge of the head became caught and 
pinned his right index finger between itself and the 
frame, amputating the finger between the first and 
second knuckle. The hazard was not recognizable. » 
In this case study, there is also a typical SA error. As 
the attention of the employee was focused on the 
operational test and not on the position of his hands, 
the main SA demon involved in this SA error is 
“Attentional tunneling”.  
According to Dhillon [3], “the largest proportion of major 
injuries or deaths takes place when debugging or unsnagging 
a robot system and its interfacing devices. Some of the 
reasons for these accidents are: 
(i) Workers frequently take chances as opposed to following 
the prescribed procedures fully. 
(ii) Workers often forget about hazards associated with a 
robot under normal or abnormal conditions. 
(iii) Workers become preoccupied and self-satisfied.” 
These 3 reasons are typically encountered in the aerospace 
domain and are closely linked to situation awareness issues. 
As previously illustrated, in most robotics accidents, SA 
demons can easily be identified and are clearly very similar 
to accidents encountered in aeronautics. For these reasons, it 
is expected that PRA based on SA demons might be very 
similar and if a hierarchy of SA demons is performed 
according to its probability of involvement in accidents, it 
might well be the case that the same hierarchy would be 
obtained in both domains. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is proposed here to help human factors experts to 
perform a situation awareness degradation risk assessment. It 
is based on Endsley’s model of situation awareness, Bayesian 
networks and a methodology based on the experience gained 
with the knowledge of past accidents and a maturity model 
that takes into account the improvement of interfaces, 
procedures and training. Several methods, based on HFACS 
model, already exist and provide PRA, but they can be 
improved using our model, which is focused on SA demons. 
In order to calculate conditional probabilities, a careful 
analysis of past accidents can be undertaken. Human factors 
experts can eventually propose their own predictions, based 
on their understanding of the risks, taking into account PRA 
in robotics. 
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